Wednesday, January 5, 2011

US army fabricates a new history of the Wanat battle-Afghanistan

Since I am going to be short on time the next couple of days, I am going to stick with some news stories. This one continues on with the Afghanistan war.
What is notable about this bit of news?
It is a clear demonstration of the psy-op, mind control practices- employed by the military.
In this case the American military, but all nation's military engages in these types of practices.
To keep you uninformed. To keep you duped.
And, to always lay blame at the feet of the lower ranks. We saw this in the Abu Ghraib torture abuse photo-op scandal. Recall, it was " just a few bad apples" in the lower ranks. Which was Grade A baloney! The Abu-Ghraib torture scandal reached all the way to the top of the heap, to individuals such as Donald Rumsfield and Nancy Pelosi

I am not going to rehash this sordid affair, one of so many..
So let's read the latest on the Army editing/rewriting history of the deadly battle of Wanat

The history of the July 2008 battle was almost two years in the making and triggered a roiling debate at all levels of the Army about whether mid-level and senior battlefield commanders should be held accountable for mistakes made under the extreme duress of combat.

An initial draft of the Wanat history, which was obtained by The Washington Post and other media outlets in the summer of 2009, placed the preponderance of blame for the losses on the higher-level battalion and brigade commanders who oversaw the mission, saying they failed to provide the proper resources to the unit in Wanat.

The final history, released in recent weeks, drops many of the earlier conclusions and instead focuses on failures of lower-level commanders.


The battle of Wanat, which took place in a remote mountain village near the Pakistan border, produced four investigations and sidetracked the careers of several Army officers, whose promotions were either put on hold or canceled. The 230-page Army history is likely to be the military's last word on the episode, and reflects a growing consensus within the ranks that the Army should be cautious in blaming battlefield commanders for failures in demanding wars such as the conflict in Afghanistan.


Why should the Army be cautious in blaming commanders? Is this not why they are in command? To lead/support and ensure the troops are supplied and carry out orders.
This is politics within the Army.

The initial investigation, conducted by a three-star Marine Corps general and completed in the spring, found that the company and battalion commanders were "derelict in their duty" to provide proper oversight and resources to the soldiers fighting at Wanat.

This investigation was also reviewed by General Petraeus, who concluded that based on Army doctrine, the brigade commander, who was the senior U.S. officer in the area, also failed in his job. He recommended that all three officers be issued letters of reprimand, which would essentially end their careers.

And this is where Army politics kicks in- for this was a career ender. As it should have been.
But, wait.....

After the officers appealed their reprimands, a senior Army general in the United States reversed the decision to punish the officers, formerly members of the the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

Gen. Charles Campbell told family members of the deceased that the letters of reprimand would have a chilling effect on other battlefield commanders.


But, what about the effect on the families of the deceased? Those who are now being blamed?
The loud and clear message is sent. Who gives a crap about the grunts? Not the army.

Family members of the deceased at Wanat reacted with anger and disappointment to the final version of the Army history.

"They blame the platoon-level leadership for all the mistakes at Wanat," said retired Col. David Brostrom, whose son was killed in the fighting. "It blames my dead son. They really missed the point."
The (re-written) history focuses mostly on the failures of lower-level commanders to patrol aggressively in the area around Wanat as they were building their defenses. It also criticizes 1st Lt. Jonathan Brostrom, a 24-year-old platoon leader, for placing a key observation point in an area that did not provide the half-dozen U.S. soldiers placed there a broad enough view to spot the enemy.

"The placement of the OP [Observation Post] is perhaps the most important factor contributing to the course of the engagement at Wanat," the report states


Directly contradicting the first report-

The initial investigation, by contrast, found that the placement of the post was not a major factor in the outcome of the battle.


Oh, well this way the higher ups are off the hook. The grunts are to blame. And the all important careers are saved. Though many ended up dead.

"We are talking about people's lives here," he said. "Officers have to be held accountable for their actions. They can't be given a free ride when lives are involved. If you screw up, you have to pay a price."

No you don't. History get's re-written so careers can be saved. As for the dead? They can take the blame. After all, they are dead. NO careers to worry about.

2 comments:

  1. Another page of history down the memory hole.

    ReplyDelete
  2. This is why we "fail to learn from history" thereby dooming ourselves to repeat it.

    We don't know REAL, TRUE, history, it is all altered for political purposes.

    ReplyDelete

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