Saturday, August 15, 2015

Who is Steering the House of Saud?

Interesting article from Foreign Policy

Read the entire article at above link- I'm just posting the interesting bits- Keeping an eye on a number of situations- Consider this some pertinent background info for when the situation gets kicked up a couple of notches in KSA. As is already happening and will most certainly get worse- As the planned remake of the middle east expands
 Saudi Arabia’s local chapters of the Islamic State have turned out to be less than discriminating in their target selection. In May, two Shiite mosques in the Eastern province were hit, killing 26 people. On August 6, the jihadi group blasted a Sunni mosque in the kingdom’s southwest, close to the Yemen border; 15 people died, mostly Saudi security personnel. It was a reminder to Saudi royals that the Islamic State, while sharing their anti-Shiite instincts, also loathes the House of Saud and everything it stands for.
Odd that we are supposed to believe that SA funds ISIS? However ISIS is striking Saudi Arabia?
Delivering a message of loathing-
It’s also a reminder that Saudi Arabia’s ongoing clampdown on the Islamic State will continue. Last month, Saudi authorities announced the arrests of 431 suspected members of the group. Although the vast majority of the kingdom’s roughly 27 million citizens probably prefer the leadership of King Salman to the chaos which has swept the Arab world since 2011, a not insignificant portion of Saudi youth appear inspired by visions of jihad constantly fed to them by social media and find that their youthful fervor is often not condemned by Saudi society.
 The Saudi mosque bombings are just one sign of the mounting domestic and foreign crises facing the kingdom
  Achieving this balance will be particularly challenging if there are further incidents attributable to the Islamic State or any sign of retaliation from Saudi Arabia’s Shiite population.
 So, we are definitely looking at the beginning of  a Saudi subversion campaign
The relationship between Mohammed bin Nayef and Mohammed bin Salman has prompted much debate in foreign-policy circles across the world. There is little doubt that the Saudi monarch wants Mohammed bin Salman to become king someday; the only question is whether Nayef will be allowed to squeeze in a reign between the two men. Many Saudi watchers currently believe King Salman will announce his retirement and declare that Mohammed bin Salman has replaced him — the system of succession is in flux, and the only iron clad rule seems to be that the king’s desires are paramount.
There is conflicting information on whether a rivalry exists between the two princes. Some say that Mohammed bin Nayef — or at least those courtiers who would lose out in this maneuver — is plotting his own accession, which will sideline his younger cousin. Other reports from foreigners who have dealt with them, however, say that the two rivals can actually function well as a team.

The partnership will be increasingly tested in the coming months. The two men are charged with pushing Saudi Arabia’s often fractious defense establishment to work toward a common goal: Mohammed bin Nayef is also minister of interior, responsible for domestic security, and Mohammed bin Salman is defense minister and therefore de facto commander of the Saudi army, air force, and navy. Traditionally, Saudi Arabia’s Interior Ministry and military do not function well together. A third force is the Saudi Arabian National Guard, commanded by Prince Mitab bin Abdullah, whose ambitions to be king diminished when his father died six months ago and vanished completely when the king elevated Mohammed bin Salman to the deputy crown prince slot in April. Mitab, seen as an ally of Mohammed bin Nayef, is clinging onto his national guard role despite reports that Mohammed bin Salman wants to absorb the essentially tribal force into the Saudi land forces, making Mitab redundant.
The Yemen campaign is the most immediate problem facing the kingdom’s new national security team. The Saudi-led coalition’s airstrikes, which started in March, have failed to defeat the Houthi rebels and have turned the situation into a whack-a-mole game against former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s forces, wreaking massive collateral damage on innocent civilians. The government of exiled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi has recently reestablished a toehold in the southern port city of Aden, from which a United Arab Emirates tank column advanced northwards earlier this week. But the Saleh-Houthi alliance remains intact.
 The role of the UAE, the only significant player to join the Saudi-led coalition, may have changed the course of the war. Operating out of a forward base in Eritrea, the preferred weapon of Emirati forces from the elite Presidential Guard has been suitcases of cash, as they attempt to bribe local tribes in southern Yemen to fight against the Houthis. Disquietingly, al Qaeda elements have also been recruited into the ranks of fighters.
Syria also remains a top Saudi concern, because of Riyadh’s antipathy toward President Bashar al-Assad and the desire to deal his Iranian backers a strategic defeat. There has been a great deal of diplomatic activity on this front in recent days: Secretary of State John Kerry, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir met in Doha this week; the Syrian foreign minister traveled to Oman; and there are rumors of a visit to Riyadh by a Syrian intelligence chief.

I had been trying to get a handle on what all this going back and forth has been about, but, it's not been entirely clear. Any clarification or assistance would be appreciated?
In addition to its battles against foreign and domestic enemies, Saudi Arabia’s rulers must contend with a financial crunch. The price of oil has dipped south of $50 per barrel again, and Saudi Arabia has announced plans to borrow a whopping $27 billion. Heavy expenditures in Yemen and handouts of an estimated $32 billion to keep the population sweet when King Salman came to power have been a clear drain on the Saudi treasury.

Who is the key Saudi decision-maker on economic issues? That would be the 29-year old Mohammed bin Salman, in his role as chairman of the economic and development council. And once again, it points to the trouble facing the kingdom: The ledger of what needs to be done against what resources are available does not balance.
Any thoughts?


  1. My only comment is to query whether the sudden, dramatic drop in the price of oil has anything to do with Khibiny....or the technology thereof...which could provide virtually "free" energy. Just a thought.


  2. I won't shade a tear (maybe some of joy) when this medieval regime will collapse.

  3. the house of Ibn Saud is of Edomite extraction...

    same as the moneychangers in the city of London,

    the Gog & Magog "Proselytes" in Palestine are not "Hebrews".

    the fog banks of confusion were manufactured by the

    "Synagogue of Satan"...for filthy lucre.

    See Zephaniah 3:9.



  4. Hi Pen

    sorry it's been a while, hope you and yours are well

    I was struck by this:

    " ... will be particularly challenging if there are further incidents attributable to the Islamic State ..."

    especially this part

    " ... further incidents attributable to the Islamic State ... "

    especially this part

    " ... attributable ... "

    Do you see what I mean?

    How hard would it be to do something that was "attributable" to somebody else?

    How hard would it be to convince the public that "attributable" means anything other than

    "X could be blamed for something done by Y"

    Now do you see what I mean?

    I'm sorry I can't express it more succinctly, but if this is the level of analysis we're starting with, how confident can we be of the conclusions?

    best wishes as always

    1. Hi Winter

      I see EXACTLY what you mean!!

      Everything that requires NATO intervention in order to remake the middle east is 'attributed to ' ISIS

      This is in point of fact the exact point I've been making with KurdIShIS

      WP: "X could be blamed for something done by Y"

      Because what is called ISIS (in Iraq and Syria & I'm certain in Turkey) seems to have much to do with Kurds

      However everything is "ISIS"- Or attributed to ISIS.
      Now lets take what you are suggesting and expand on it a bit....

      " ... will be particularly challenging if there are further incidents attributable to the Islamic State ..."

      Which I started to in the post body, suggesting, there will be a further upping or extension of the subversion of the Saudi nation ATTRIBUTED to ISIS-

      In the case of KSA the Kurds will not form the majority basis for ISIS- I would think we would be looking at Al Nusra brand and ever more foreign fighters along side NATO nation special forces

      ISIS is what ever it needs to be to the destabilizers and if Saudi Arabia is in their sites- ISIS will be formed of fighters who are willing to fight for that specific cause- (mercs, poor and aimless, psychos) .. ISIS will be even more full of Israeli's then it is presently

      Still attribution will go to ISIS-

      Thanks WP: I loved your line of thinking and hoped my thoughts were along that same track? Let me know?

    2. Yeah, Pen, we're on the same page on this one.