The answer looks to be a planned further destabilization with either a complete removal of Maliki or Maliki as a purposeless leader of a fiefdom.
Before you read the information below please read #1- The US Departure from Iraq was all Illusion!
And- #2 Very Telling! US REBUFFED multiple prior Iraq requests to quash ISIS
It's important for filling in the blank places
Now onto the WP article
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) genuinely stunning capture of Mosul, and advances across Iraq, look like a real turning point in regional politics. Even if the territorial gains by ISIS are reversed, its offensive has already rapidly reframed analytical debates over the nature and fortunes of al-Qaeda and the jihadist movement, the ability to contain spillover from Syria, possible areas of U.S.-Iranian cooperation and the viability of President Obama’s light-footprint Middle East strategy.Stunning advances? I don’t think so. It's not a stunning advance when it is known to be coming and is aided all along the way.
There is that spillover narrative from Syria which is bogus. ISIS originated in Iraq and made it’s way to Syria with much NATO support along the way.
“The most wide-ranging verdicts are clearly premature. It’s too soon to declare the rapid end to the state of Iraq and the Sykes-Picot borders, with ISIS carving out a Sunni Islamic state and leaving Kurdistan to the Kurds and the Shiite areas to Iran’s merciesAs has been the plan by NATO for all these years..
The absence of U.S. troops because of the 2011 withdrawal is an extremely minor part of the story at best. The destruction of Iraq by the US is a very major part of this story, notice that isn’t mentioned? The intense interaction between the Syrian and Iraqi insurgencies is certainly an important accelerant, but again is only part of the story. Nor is the U.S. reluctance to provide more arms to “moderate” Syrian rebels really the key to the growth of ISIS in Syria or in Iraq.
“The reluctance to provide more arms to ‘moderate’ rebels is key to the growth of ISIS”
There has been no reluctance to provide arms to mercs and there are no ‘moderate rebels’. Which means the key to the growth of ISIS has been the provision of arms by the US, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other assorted warmongering nations
It’s a bit hard to believe that the jihadists who have joined up with ISIS would have been deterred by the presence of U.S.-backed forces – “Well, we were going to wage jihad to establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, but the U.S. is arming moderates so I guess we’ll stay home.” In reality, the shift to an externally fueled insurgency and the flow of money and weapons to a variety of armed groups is what created the conditions that allowed ISIS to thrive in the first place”
That, right, just like I said- Externally fuelled with money and weapons allowed ISIS to thrive.
See my comment in red italics right above this quoted paragraph
The more interesting questions are about Iraq itself. 1-Why are these cities falling virtually without a fight? 2-Why are so many Iraqi Sunnis seemingly pleased to welcome the takeover from the Iraqi government by a truly extremist group with which they have a long, violent history? 3-Why are Iraqi Sunni political factions and armed groups, which previously fought against al-Qaeda in Iraq, now seemingly cooperating with ISIS? 4-Why is the Iraqi military dissolving rather than fighting to hold its territory? How can the United States help the Iraqi government fight ISIS without simply enabling Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s authoritarianism and sectarianism?
You know the answer to the first 4 questions because they are all answered in the # 1 article linked at the top!
The answer to the last question helping the Iraqi government etc.? The US does not want to help the Iraqi government they want only to weaken and divide Iraq
The most important answers lie inside Iraqi politics. Maliki lost Sunni Iraq through his sectarian and authoritarian policies. His repeated refusal over long years to strike an urgently needed political accord with the Sunni minority, his construction of corrupt, ineffective and sectarian state institutions, and his heavy-handed military repression in those areas are the key factors in the long-developing disintegration of Iraq. In late 2012, protests had swelled across Sunni areas of Iraq, driven by genuine popular anger but backed by many of the political forces now reportedly cooperating with ISIS’s advance (Standard Arab spring crap). The vicious assault on the Huwija protest camp by Iraqi security forces, in the midst of political negotiations, galvanized hostility to the Iraqi state and paved the way for growing popular support for a returning insurgency. Maliki’s heavy-handed security response to the escalating insurgency across Anbar, including the bombardment of Fallujah, (controlled now by ISIS) has predictably driven more and more Sunnis into their ranks.I don't think so considering the backing of ISIS by US/NATO and the number of people under US control in Iraq- see article #1 linked above!
Maliki’s purges of the Sunni leadership discredited or removed Sunni leaders willing to play the inside game, and pushed some of them toward supporting insurgency. His exclusionary policies, attempts to monopolize power and rough security practices radicalized a Sunni community that might have been brought into the system following the civil war. Iraq’s political class as a whole has done little better.In other words Maliki has been fighting a covert destabilization but doesn't have the benefit of a national army or airforce!
U.S. officials, along with most Iraq analysts, have spent the last half-decade urging Maliki to seek a real political accord, but he had little interest in their advice. I’ve long argued that the only thing that would force Maliki to change his ways would be his perception that his survival depended on it. When U.S. troops were fighting his war and securing his rule, he consistently refused to make the political accommodations that his U.S. advisers pushed upon him. After U.S. troops left, he enjoyed sufficient political strength and military security to strike the kind of political deal that could have consolidated a legitimate Iraqi order. Instead, he moved to consolidate his personal power and punish Sunni political opponents. When he went to Washington seeking military and political support in October 2013 amidst an escalating insurgency and political tensions, he could have taken the opportunity to change course before it was too late.So Maliki went to the US for help and they probably piled a bunch of conditions on him that he couldn't comply with no matter how hard he tried, because outside forces were intent on putting the final nail in the coffin of Iraq
Maliki might now, for the first time, feel real pressure, which could force real concessions. ( Concessions to who, not the Iraqi people. The concessions will be to the global tyranny led by the US- NATO. Big beneficiary? Israel) His first instinct, naturally, has been to try to use the crisis to expand his power by calling an emergency session of parliament to pass a truly objectionable emergency law, which would give the prime minister virtually untrammeled dictatorial powers. Iraq’s parliament might be able to thwart that particular power grab (it could not muster a quorum in today’s first attempt). But it’s clear that his political instincts remain unchanged.A truly objectionable emergency law? - Considering what has been going on it seems odd the US would find it objectionable- war on terror and all that! This just isn't sitting right, no it isn't!
The US has Maliki right where they want him-Maliki wants U.S. military aid, from helicopters to airstrikes, to fight the ISIS advance. Many in Washington will want to offer assistance to save Iraq from complete collapse. But at the same time, U.S. policymakers understand from painful experience that such military aid will simply enable Maliki’s autocratic sectarianism and allow him to avoid making any serious concessions. Yes, the United States should try to use this moment of leverage to attach political conditions to any military aid. But such leverage is going to face an obvious problem: It will be virtually impossible to force any meaningful political moves in the midst of an urgent crisis, and any promises made now will quickly be forgotten once the crisis has passed.
The post from yesterday has become that much clearer-